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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis analyzes the corporate income tax, more specifically related to foreign 
sourced income, and proposes a solution to reduce the desirability of tax inversions and 
restore the competitiveness of United States’ corporations. The paper introduces the topic 
and discusses why corporate taxation has returned to the forefront of political discussion. 
It then addresses early 2000s regulation passed in response to increased inversion activity 
of the late ‘90s and how that regulation failed to achieve its intended purpose. Then, the 
current laws will be introduced with a focus on corporate actions to circumvent these 
laws in order to reduce tax liabilities. Then, I will propose a solution that emphasizes 
altering the incentives of corporations as opposed to creating rules to prevent corporate 
actions. 
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Introduction 
  President Obama made the following remarks regarding corporate tax inversions, 
“They're declaring they're based someplace else even though most of their operations are 
here... My attitude is I don't care if it's legal -- it's wrong.” President Obama made these 
comments in July of 2014 amidst a flurry of recently completed and proposed corporate 
inversions. These transactions generally involve a U.S.-based firm merging with a 
foreign-based firm so that the U.S.-based firm, which is usually the surviving entity, can 
move its headquarters outside the United States. Once completed, inverted corporations 
often predict billions of dollars in tax savings. With an increasing aversion to corporate 
greed, many people become wary when they see corporations lowering their tax bills 
while they simultaneously achieve record-breaking profits. Fed up with a loss in tax 
revenue, President Obama and other political figures began to question the substance of 
these transactions as well as the moral character of corporations willing to invert.  
 On the flip side, U.S. corporations argue that corporate tax laws are outdated and 
present an unfair burden, often placing firms in a situation where an inversion makes the 
most economic sense. At 35% (39.1% when state taxes are included), the United States 
levies one of the highest corporate tax rates in the world. On top of this, the United States 
is on a worldwide taxation system. This means the government taxes U.S. corporations 
on all income regardless of where they earn it. Most other nations use a less burdensome 
territorial system, in which a nation only taxes income earned within that nation (this is a 
simplified definition that will be discussed later in the paper). Especially burdensome and 
unlike their U.S. counterparts, foreign firms face no taxation on their foreign earnings in 
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the United States. Therefore, U.S.-based corporations have a significant tax disadvantage 
relative to most foreign corporations, who also tend to headquarter in low tax territories.  
 The two sides of this argument tend to arrive at two different conclusions. The 
first side concludes corporations are wrong to invert. If they are based in the United 
States, they should pay their fair share of taxes. They should not be able to engage in a 
transaction that largely lacks economic substance simply to minimize this obligation. 
Thus, the United States should alter laws regarding inversions in order to make it more 
difficult to reap tax benefits from such transactions.  
 The other side argues the current corporate tax laws have placed an unfair burden 
on U.S.-based corporations. An identical foreign-based corporation has a clear advantage 
over its U.S.-based counterpart. This seem contrary the logic of most tax laws. It makes 
very little sense to have a system that discourages corporations from residing in the U.S. 
Thus, the United States should alter corporate tax laws and restore the competitive 
balance for U.S. corporations. Once competitive balance is restored, inversions will 
naturally fade because the incentive to do so will be gone. 
 Unfortunately, both conclusions miss important points. The former ignores the 
competitive disadvantage and assumes stricter rules will work and not open new 
loopholes. The second ignores the potential loss in tax revenue, and, thus, does not 
present a solution that the government would realistically consider. However, maybe 
there is a middle ground that exists, one that restores competitive balance without 
sacrificing tax revenue. This thesis seeks to find that middle ground. 
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Chapter I. 1997-2004 
 The landscape regarding corporate tax inversions changed in 1997.  Inversions 
were not a new concept at this point. McDermott International relocated to Panama in 
1983 and Helen of Troy did the same in the early ‘90s, which prompted the IRS to make 
the built-in capital gains taxable to shareholders upon inversion. However, what made 
1997 distinct was that it paved the way for several other companies to invert and caught 
the attention of the U.S. government on a more significant scale.  
 In July of 1997 Tyco International Ltd. (Tyco) completed its merger with ADT 
Limited (ADT). On its surface, Tyco had at least some motivation to merge with ADT 
beyond tax motivations. In fact, when the Wall Street Journal reported on the proposed 
merger, it dedicated one sentence to the tax rationale behind the transaction, and the New 
York Times was no different.1 The bulk of the articles discussed how ADT, which 
possessed a strong brand in the home security market, would provide Tyco with cost 
savings related to the buying of supplies needed to produce alarm systems as well as 
“expand Tyco's ability to offer homes and offices monitoring services for their fire and 
burglar alarms.”2 However, despite the existence of potentially legitimate business 
reasons, based on the structure of the transaction, it would be difficult to deny that it was 
largely tax driven. 
 The terms of the merger dictated that Tyco would merge with a unit of ADT with 
ADT becoming the parent of Tyco. However, ADT agreed to rename itself Tyco after the 
merger with the Tyco CEO, Dennis Kozlowski, becoming the CEO of the “new” Tyco, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Bagli, Charles. "ADT and Tyco Plan to Merge In $5.4 Billion Stock Swap." 
2 "Tyco International to Merge With ADT in Complex Deal." 
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the “new” board would be controlled by “old” Tyco’s board of directors, and “new” Tyco 
would continue to be operationally headquarted in Exeter, New Hampshire, as it was 
before the merger.3 However, as the result of the transaction, “new” Tyco was able to use 
ADT’s place of domicile, which was in Bermuda, despite ADT’s operational 
headquarters being located in Boca Raton, Florida. 4 Tyco created this seemingly odd 
structure in order to list its place of domicile as Bermuda in order to reap the tax benefits 
of a Bermuda-based corporation.  In 2001 alone, it was reported that Tyco saved around 
$400 million in taxes because of its merger with ADT.5   
Most companies knew the tax benefits of inversions. However, most feared that 
their share price would drop because there was an assumption that a company would have 
to pay an unreasonably high price to invert, not to mention the potential public backlash 
surrounding an inversion.6 Tyco proved this assumption wrong and quelled the fears of 
other firms, as its stock price improved post-inversion. Thus, the success of the Tyco 
inversion convinced several other firms to engage in similar deals including Fruit of the 
Loom (1998) and Ingersoll Rand (2001).7  By this point, the US government was fed up 
with the loss of tax revenue from these inversions and sought to close the loopholes being 
exploited by US-based corporations. 
 Ultimately, the U.S. government recognized the lack of economic substance 
present in these transactions. No one truly believed these global corporations had a 
legitimate business purpose in Bermuda or the Cayman Islands and few would even deny 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid 
5 “Corporate Inversion: Senate Hearing” 
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid 
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it.  Therefore in 2004, Congress enacted legislation that largely dictates the current 
environment. 
Chapter II. Recent Changes to the Law 
 When Congress sought to slow down inversions in 2004, it focused on the rules 
regarding a corporation’s ability to change its corporate headquarters. Prior to 2004, 
regulation on this matter was either non-existent or ineffective. The relatively unregulated 
environment permitted corporations to conduct “naked inversions.” In a pre-2004 naked 
inversion, performed by the likes of Tyco and Accenture, “a U.S. firm would form a new 
holding company in a tax haven country, and the public shareholders of the U.S. firm 
would become the public shareholders of the new tax haven holding company.”8 Often 
times no business purpose existed, and the process was relatively easy and painless. 
Operating headquarters remained in the United States, the stock still traded on U.S. 
exchanges, and the holding company essentially existed on paper only. 9 Thus, in 2004 
Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 7874 as a part of the Americans 
Job Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA).  
 Section 7874 placed restrictions on inversions, in which, the former owners of the 
acquired domestic corporation owned at least 60% of the stock of the newly formed 
foreign corporation after the acquisition. There are two levels of restrictions. One in 
which the ownership level is between 60%-80%, and one in which the ownership level is 
greater than or equal to 80%. The former situation recognizes the newly formed 
corporation as foreign, however, imposes “U.S. toll taxes (taxes on gains) that apply to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Hungerford, Thomas. "Policy Responses to Corporate Inversions.” 
9 Ibid 
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transfers of assets to the new entity, which are not permitted to be offset by foreign tax 
credits or net operating losses.”10 This special gain recognition requirement would be 
imposed for a ten-year period following the acquisition.11 The IRC defined this gain as:  
“the income or gain recognized by reason of the transfer during the applicable period of 
stock or other properties by an expatriated entity, and any income received or accrued 
during the applicable period by reason of a license of any property by an expatriated 
entity”12 
 For acquisitions that exceed the greater than or equal to 80% ownership threshold, 
the recognition of special gains does not apply; however, for purposes of the IRC, AJCA 
ignores the substance of the transaction and treats the newly formed foreign corporation 
as a domestic corporation.13 Thus, AJCA essentially prohibits a corporation from 
recognizing any tax benefits associated with its inversion. The regulation also included a 
clause regarding substantial business activity. The law exempted corporations 
(recognized them as foreign) with substantial business activity in its new place of 
residence.14 However, the initial regulation failed to provide guidance as to what 
constituted “substantial.”  
 Section 7874 effectively addressed the so-called “naked inversions” described 
earlier. Proving substantial economic activity in the Cayman Islands or Bermuda would 
be next to impossible, and most of the acquisitions exceeded the 80% threshold. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Marples, Donald. “Corporate Expatriation, Inversions, and Mergers: Tax Issues.” pg 6. 
11 VanderWolk, Jefferson. "Inversions under Section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code: 
Flawed Legislation, Flawed Guidance." 
12 "26 U.S. Code § 7874 - Rules Relating to Expatriated Entities and Their Foreign 
Parents." 
13 VanderWolk, Jefferson. "Inversions under Section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code: 
Flawed Legislation, Flawed Guidance." 
14 Marples, Donald. “Corporate Expatriation, Inversions, and Mergers: Tax Issues.” 
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However, the rules did little in the way of slowing down other forms of inversions. 
Corporations simply found ways around the rules. Post-2004 inversions often fell just 
under the 80% or 60% threshold, and instead of no-tax regions like Bermuda or the 
Cayman Islands, corporations inverted to low or territorial tax regions such as Ireland or 
the United Kingdom, regions where substantial economic activity would be relatively 
easy to prove.  
 Recognizing its failures, the IRS and the Treasury have repeatedly attempted to 
tighten its regulation on inversions since 2004. In 2006, they provided insight as to what 
constituted substantial business activity by creating a safe harbor threshold and providing 
factors to be considered in determining “substantial.” The factors included, but were not 
limited to analyzing the corporation’s historical presence, operational activities (such as 
property owned, employee performance and services, and sales), management activities, 
ownership of residents, and strategic actions that existed within the foreign country.15 The 
safe harbor exempted corporations so long as the foreign parent accounted for at least 
10% of the whole corporation’s total employee head count and compensation, business 
tangible assets, and sales.16 However, these changes also failed to stop inversions. 
Ultimately, the Treasury raised the 10% threshold to 25%. However, corporations still 
managed, as before, to just meet thresholds imposed by the government allowing 
inversions to continue on frequently and relevantly.   
 This past September, the Treasury Department, facing pressure from the media 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 VanderWolk, Jefferson. "Inversions under Section 7874 of the Internal Revenue Code: 
Flawed Legislation, Flawed Guidance." 
16 Ibid 
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and the President, expanded upon section 7874. The Treasury’s actions focused on two 
basic components of inversions. The first limited a U.S. firm’s ability to access the 
accumulated deferred earnings of its foreign subsidiary, and the second limited a firm’s 
ability to manipulate elements of the transaction in order to qualify for the less than 80% 
ownership level.17 With regards to the former limitation, in an inversion a foreign 
subsidiary of the original U.S. corporation remains a subsidiary of the U.S. corporation; it 
does not become a subsidiary of the newly formed foreign parent.18 Therefore, dividends 
paid to the U.S. firm by the foreign subsidiary should remain taxable. However, 
corporations use several methods to avoid this tax; three of which the Treasury addressed 
in September. 
 Firstly, the Treasury sought to restrict the use of “hopscotch loans. ” Hopscotch 
loans, in this context, occur when the foreign subsidiary of the U.S. corporation issues a 
loan to the new foreign parent. Then, the foreign parent issues dividends, or a low interest 
loan, to the U.S. corporation. Since the dividends come from the foreign parent and not 
the foreign subsidiary, they are not taxed in the United States. The new regulation treats 
these loans, or any obligation or stock issued between related foreign parties, as taxable 
U.S. property.19  
 Secondly, the Treasury addressed “decontrolling.” Decontrolling occurs when the 
acquiring foreign corporation purchases the majority of the stock of the foreign 
subsidiary of the U.S. corporation. Once the purchase takes place, the foreign subsidiary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Marples, Donald. “Corporate Expatriation, Inversions, and Mergers: Tax Issues.” 9. 
18 Ibid 
19 Ibid 
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seizes to be a Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) and, thus, the subpart F income no 
longer gets taxed in the United States (both these terms will be discussed later but subpart 
F income generally refers to passively-earned foreign income). Now, the regulation treats 
the acquisition of stock in the foreign subsidiary as the acquisition of stock in the U.S. 
corporation, which makes it a taxable transaction.20 
 The last method is not as significant, but it “addresses transactions where the 
foreign acquiring corporation sells stock of the former U.S. parent corporation to that 
U.S. parent corporation’s CFC in exchange for property or cash.”21 When structured 
properly, some of the income would have been able to avoid taxation. This transaction is 
now ignored and the income does not avoid taxation.  
 As stated earlier, the new Treasury regulations also limit a corporation’s ability to 
fall under the 80% ownership level by restricting a few tax planning techniques. It 
reduces a corporation’s ability to inflate the size of the acquiring foreign corporation by 
using passive assets such as interest bearing bank deposits; such that, if passive assets 
represent more than 50% of the foreign acquiring firm’s value, then the passive assets are 
disregarded (these rules do not pertain to banks and financial service companies).22  
 The Treasury rules also prevent a U.S. corporation from reducing its value 
through paying an unordinary amount in dividends. 23 The Treasury now disregards these 
dividends and values the corporation as if the dividends never occurred. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid 
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid 
23 Ibid 
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 Lastly, the Treasury addressed the problem of so-called “spinversions.” A 
spinversion, as the name implies, occurs when a corporation spins-off a portion of its 
business into a newly formed entity, and then inverts this newly formed entity by 
merging it with a foreign corporation.24 Larger corporations generally avoid inversions 
because doing so is too costly and often result in political fallout. Thus, spinversions 
allow larger corporations to perform inversions without facing the fallout of inverting the 
entire business.   Now, the Treasury treats the spun-off company as a domestic 
corporation essentially eliminating the tax benefits of a spinversion.  
 These regulations have successfully deterred corporations from inverting, at least 
in the interim. Shortly after the Treasury released its regulations, U.S. drug maker 
AbbVie, Inc. reconsidered its $55 billion deal with Irish-based Shire PLC because it lost 
some of its ability to access its foreign accumulated earnings tax-free. The spinversion 
rules put the breaks on Mylan Inc.’s proposed takeover of Abbot Laboratories. However, 
the new regulations did not deter every corporation. Most notably, Medtronic Inc. still 
intends to acquire Irish-based Covidien Plc., a deal worth $42.9 billion.  
 The new regulations may have discouraged some proposed inversions; however, 
it begs the question. Will these rules be effective in preventing inversion in the long term, 
or are they simply a temporary inconvenience for corporations who still have significant 
incentives to uncover new techniques to invert? 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Sutherland, Brooke. "Spinversions: How a Mega Co. Can Join In on Tax-Cutting Deals 
Real M&A." 
	   15	  
Chapter III. Corporate Action Post-Inversion 
Once inverted, a corporation inherits several tax benefits. It can reduce subpart F 
income, it can freely repatriate foreign earnings and reinvest it as it chooses, and it can 
utilize tax loopholes of its new nation to further strip income from the United States. 
 Although U.S. corporations can defer paying taxes on significant portions of their 
foreign income, Congress created subpart F income to lessen the revenue effect of 
income deferral. Subpart F income represents income earned by a U.S. corporation’s 
Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) that the U.S. corporation must recognize the year 
in which it is earned. Therefore, the income is treated as distributed regardless of whether 
the income is actually distributed. 
 The IRS defines a CFC as: 
 “Any foreign corporation in which more than 50 percent of the total combined voting 
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote is owned directly, indirectly, or 
constructively by U.S. shareholders on any day during the taxable year of such foreign 
corporation or more than 50% of the total value of the stock is owned directly, indirectly 
or constructively by U.S. shareholders on any day during the taxable year of the 
corporation.”25 
A CFC should not be confused with a foreign branch, which is not considered a separate 
legal entity forcing all income to be recognized by the parent corporation. With CFC’s, 
however, only distributed and deemed distributed (Subpart F) income are taxable to the 
parent. 
 The U.S. tax code generally permits corporations to defer taxation on foreign 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 "26 U.S. Code § 7874 - Rules Relating to Expatriated Entities and Their Foreign 
Parents." 
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earnings that it actively reinvests in foreign subsidiaries. Thus, the IRS created Subpart F 
income in order to capture the non-active, passive income of foreign subsidiaries. Once 
calculated, Subpart F income is deemed distributed and, thus, taxable to the U.S. parent 
regardless of whether a distribution has actually taken place. IRC Section 952 lists five 
general categories of income that should be included in subpart F income, and they are: 
insurance income, foreign-based company income; income from countries subject to 
international boycotts; illegal bribes, kickbacks, and other similar payments; and income 
from countries where the United States has severed diplomatic relations.26 This paper will 
focus on the second inclusion (foreign-based company income) as it is the most 
complicated and most easy to manipulate.  
 Foreign-based company income addresses a couple key aspects of subpart F 
income. It includes foreign personal holding company income which mostly encompasses 
passive income such as dividends, interest, royalties, capital gains, certain rents, etc.27 
Also, the IRC recognizes the prevalence of related-party transactions with regards to 
CFC’s and often treats these related-party transactions as subpart F income. 28 However, 
despite the creation of Subpart F income, inverted corporations manage to earn income 
passively without recognizing it as Subpart F.  
 When a corporation inverts outside of the United States, the CFC’s of the original 
U.S. parent remain CFC’s, and, thus, the U.S. firm must still recognize subpart F 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 "26 U.S. Code § 952 - Subpart F Income Defined." 
27 Ibid 
28 Ibid 
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income.29  However, in many inversions, the U.S. corporation often converts the CFC 
into a foreign subsidiary of the new foreign parent allowing it to avoid Subpart F income. 
And, although the new Treasury regulations largely address this issue, the practice still 
exists, albeit to a lesser degree. In addition to this, if the new foreign parent creates a 
foreign subsidiary, then this foreign subsidiary does not become a CFC of the original 
domestic corporation, thus, allowing the parent to avoid Subpart F taxation.30 
Considering CFC’s that create large portions of Subpart F income tend to perform little in 
the way of actual business operations, it would be relatively easy for the foreign parent to 
replace CFC’s with its own foreign subsidiaries.  Moreover, the foreign parent will more 
easily be able to participate in related-party transactions with its newly formed 
subsidiary, especially when both likely reside in more lenient tax environments. 
 The ability to repatriate foreign earnings tax-free represents the other, more 
obvious, incentive to invert. Prior to an inversion, a U.S.-based firm can opt to reinvest 
foreign earnings for active business purposes in order to defer recognition of this income 
in the United States. However, once a firm repatriates foreign profits back into the United 
States, the income is taxed. So, if firms defer the income long enough, they receive a 
fairly sizeable discounted tax liability. Moreover, most firms never intend to repatriate 
and plan to permanently reinvest foreign earnings. When this occurs, the firm 
hypothetically will never owe taxes to the U.S. on these profits. 
 However, despite the ability to defer income indefinitely, the system still creates 
an advantage for foreign firms.  Even a hypothetical U.S.-based corporation that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid 
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permanently reinvests all its foreign profits and earns no Subpart F income would 
struggle to compete with a foreign-based corporation of the same nature. Regardless of 
the necessity to repatriate funds, all else being equal, the firm that possesses the ability to 
freely reinvest foreign earnings into the United States is necessarily advantaged over the 
firm that does not have this option.  Thus, it creates an incentive for firms to invert. 
 Often in assessing the current landscape, people conclude that the United States 
should switch to a territorial system. And, in some ways, a territorial system would solve 
many of the current problems. A territorial system only taxes corporations on their 
income earned within that territory. Therefore, if the United States adopted this system, 
U.S.-based firms would no longer owe taxes on repatriated foreign profits, or Subpart F 
income for that matter, and foreign firms would remain unaffected.31 Therefore, a 
territorial system would restore competitive balance for U.S.-based corporations both 
domestically and internationally.  
 Under a territorial system, U.S.-based corporations could freely repatriate and 
reinvest its foreign earnings into the United States, just as foreign firms do. The system 
would also allow U.S.-based corporations to better compete against foreign corporations 
when investing in foreign projects because foreign subsidiaries of a U.S. parent would 
not have to concern themselves with U.S. taxes. This freedom to invest would have a 
stimulus effect on U.S. corporations that could potentially benefit the U.S. government 
and economy as a whole. 32 
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Chapter IV. Proposal 
 A territorial system has its benefits; however, its drawbacks should not be 
ignored. A territorial system does little to simplify the already over-complicated tax code. 
That tax code is so complicated that Americans pay an estimated $0.30 for every dollar 
they earn simply through the costs of compliance.33 Also, more complicated regulation 
often leads to the creation of more loopholes. Corporations pay millions of dollars per 
year to professional tax advisors whose primary objective is to guide their client into 
paying as little in taxes as possible. These professionals often have years of experience in 
analyzing and finding legal ways around specific regulation. The people writing the 
regulation, however, spend maybe a couple months writing it and are paid far less 
generously. In other words, the people writing the regulation are far less likely to 
recognize any loopholes implied by their regulation than the tax professionals hired to do 
so. “Simple” regulations can still create loopholes, however, the more complicated the 
regulation, the more difficult it is for the writer to account for every possible loophole.  
 Often experts argue that a territorial system simplifies the tax code because 
corporations no longer need to account for foreign income. However, upon closer 
examination this assumption does not hold. Separating foreign income and United States 
income can be quite tricky and susceptible to manipulation.34 The government would 
struggle to create overarching rules because it would have to address every industry and 
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sub-industry differently. Finding rules regarding the derivation of income for each 
industry would be very difficult. 
Although these issues still arise and are largely dealt with under the current 
system, the key difference is the change in incentives. A U.S. corporation, under the 
current system, has a significant disincentive to shift income outside of the United States 
due to the taxation of repatriated profits.35 Therefore, the rules determining U.S. versus 
foreign income do not need to close every loophole because corporations obtain less 
value in exposing them.  However, in a territorial system the disincentive does not exist. 
Remove the disincentive and suddenly the quality of the rules will be put the test. The 
success of the rules up to this point provides no proof that they will continue to work 
under a new system. Somewhere imbedded in those complicated rules, it would not be 
surprising for a sizeable loophole to exist. A loophole that avoids exploitation solely 
because there is no incentive to exploit it. Change the incentive structure, and the 
previously unutilized loophole will likely be exposed.  
In a territorial system, the United States not only becomes susceptible to its own 
loopholes, but also the loopholes of other nations. It also becomes easier for corporations 
to expose the loopholes of the nation in which they reside.36 Thus, it makes sense for 
corporations to reside in a tax-friendly region. In other words, due to the high rate and 
strict rules in the United States, under a territorial system, U.S. firms would have an even 
greater incentive than now to relocate to a more tax-friendly region creating an 
opportunity to strip more income than ever. 
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 Most of Europe, for example, is on a territorial system, so corporations often 
utilize nations with a more favorable tax environment like Ireland, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg to lower their tax liability. Google, for example, has a 
entity set up in Ireland that receives significant amounts of income related to interest, 
royalty payments, and other intangible goods and then funnels that income to an entity set 
up in the Netherlands, and then the Netherlands funnels that income back to a separate 
Irish entity that is the subsidiary of a Cayman Islands’ entity.37 This circuitous set of 
paper transactions leads to Google paying no corporate taxes on that income. Under the 
current U.S. system, this would be far less likely to occur because the incentive to shift 
income is far smaller. A territorial system encourages corporations to shift income. 
 In addition to all of this, achieving a revenue neutral scenario in a territorial 
system would be a difficult task. The United States government would lose any tax 
revenue associated with Subpart F income and repatriated income. Also, income stripping 
would likely impact revenue in a significant matter. Although many argue the United 
States should not earn revenue off foreign earnings in the first place the loss caused by 
income stripping should not be dismissed, as it could be quite significant. Just looking at 
Google alone provides insight into the substantiality of revenue loss caused by income 
shifting. The chart below shows how much Google saved by exploiting loopholes and 
taking advantage of the territorial systems of Germany, France, the UK, and the 
Netherlands:38 
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 Probably the most shocking information presented on this chart is the revenue 
split of Google Ireland Ltd. The chart shows that Google Ireland Ltd reported £15.5 
billion of revenue earned outside Ireland while reporting only £100 million in revenue 
actually earned in Ireland. This ultimately leads to Google sheltering over £8.8 billion in 
revenue.39 In other words, under a territorial system the United States government would 
not only have to consider loopholes created by itself, but also loopholes created by other 
nations.  France alone insists that Google owes it over two billion euros in taxes. When a 
corporation as massive as Google only reports around 8% of the revenue that it earns 	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within Germany, there is clearly a flaw in the system.40 One that seems unsustainable and 
unlikely to convince Congress to enact change. 
 Based upon all of this, it would make sense for the United States to avoid a 
territorial system of taxation. There are too many problems associated with it, and it fails 
to achieve many of the goals it sets out to. That being said, a pure worldwide system has 
many of is own flaws. Most notably of which being the lack of competitiveness of 
corporations. Thus, the proposal uses neither model in the strict sense. However, the 
proposal utilizes components of each while also employing characteristics unique to 
itself. 
 The first issue that the United States needs to change is the ability of corporations 
to defer foreign-sourced income. Congress created this provision in order to allow U.S.-
based corporations to compete with foreign-based ones. U.S. corporations would be at a 
clear disadvantage relative to their foreign counterparts if not for this provision. Their 
overall global tax rate would be significantly more burdensome than the rate of just about 
any foreign firm in the world. The deferral regulation achieves its goal relatively well. 
However, the deferral caveat makes little sense from the perspective of the United States, 
and there are other means by which to restore competitive balance.  
  Most firms avoid repatriating foreign funds and often have the intention of 
indefinitely reinvesting foreign earnings.41 When a corporation intends to permanently 
reinvest foreign earnings into active business activities of a foreign subsidiary, it will 
essentially never owe taxes to the United States on those profits. The incentive structure 
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presented is clear. The system encourages firms to never reinvest their profits in the 
United States.  
This seems counter-intuitive to the entire logic of the tax code. The tax code 
should either have a neutral effect (i.e., it raises revenue without changing action), or it 
should encourage action that benefits the United States (i.e., tax breaks to stimulate the 
economy). However, the deferral laws offer a tax break to corporations that stimulates the 
economies of other nations. So, yes, the government should enact regulation that allows 
U.S. corporations to be more competitive. However, in doing so, they should find a 
solution that benefits the United States, not other nations. 
 Thus, corporations should not be allowed to defer the recognition of foreign 
income. They should be taxed on all foreign income the year in which they earn it. This 
will ultimately provide dual purposes. First off, it will raise the total amount of taxable 
income, which increases the likelihood of arriving at revenue neutral situation. Secondly, 
removing the incentive to store funds abroad will increase investments in the United 
States and stimulate the economy.42 The reinvested profits also have the possibility of 
boosting overall taxable income.  Obviously not all foreign profits will be repatriated; 
however, some, with the possibility of a lot, is certainly better than none.  
 Ultimately, discouraging the storing of profits abroad is the goal of a territorial 
system. However, by taxing corporations on their profits as they earn them, the United 
States achieves the benefits of a territorial system while overcoming its weaknesses. 
Profits are repatriated while decreasing the incentive to shift income and increasing the 
likelihood of a revenue neutral scenario. To reiterate the point, the rationale behind 	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revenue neutrality is that it becomes a far more realistic option for the government to 
adopt. In other words, the greater the revenue gap, the less likely the government changes 
the current system. 
 The United States should also eliminate the foreign tax credit. The foreign tax 
credit complicates the tax code and rarely provides corporations with the “one-to-one” 
credit that people often claim. Determining when foreign tax credits can be used, how 
many can be utilized from a particular nation in a particular year, and how to properly 
allocate them can be quite difficult and cumbersome.43 Of course, if the United States 
were to eliminate both the foreign tax credit and the ability to defer foreign-sourced 
income and kept the same corporate tax rate, then the U.S. would be placing an 
unsustainably high burden on its corporations. All but a few of the more powerful firms 
would have any chance of competing with foreign-based firms. Therefore, adjustments 
have to be made to the tax rate structure in order to compensate for this clearly unfair and 
unreasonable burden. 
The United States would benefit from a corporate tax structure, in which, 
corporations based in the United States pay a lower tax rate on U.S.-sourced income 
relative to the rate applied to foreign-based corporations.  U.S. corporations, however, 
should also pay a small tax on foreign income the year in which it is earned. Foreign 
corporations will, of course, continue to pay nothing to the United States on foreign-
sourced income. This structure should achieve several goals. First, by taxing foreign 
income as corporations earn it, it removes the disincentive to keep profits abroad. Second, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43  Kleinbard, Edward. “Throw Territorial Taxation From the Train.”  
 
	   26	  
it restores the competitive balance for U.S. firms. Although U.S. corporations will be 
taxed on foreign profits, the tax will be small and, to compensate, domestic profits will be 
taxed at a lower rate compared to domestic profits of foreign firms. Third, it ultimately 
should not impact tax revenue negatively. Lastly, the system should align incentives so 
that corporations will accurately decide for themselves where to place their headquarters 
with the hope that headquartering rules will not be needed. 
 Before analyzing which rates should apply, Congress should reconsider the 
current corporate rate. Sitting at 35% (39.1% when the average state corporate tax is 
added), the United States has the third highest corporate tax rate in the world behind only 
the United Arab Emirates and Chad.44 Although the effective rate ends up at around 23% 
for domestic companies and around 28% for multinational corporations, this still ends up 
higher in comparison to the effective rates of most other nations.45 If the effective rate 
already sits significantly lower, would it not make sense to lower the statutory rate and 
close many of the credits and loopholes? Since some of the credits and loopholes benefit 
some firms more than others, doing so would spread the benefits of a lower rate more 
evenly across all firms.46 Also, corporations could lower their costs associated with more 
aggressive tax planning, and this change would have a minimal effect on revenue if 
structured properly. 
Thus, it would make sense to lower the overall tax rate to a more reasonable level, 
one that is more competitive and in line with other nations in the OECD (the corporate 
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tax rate average for OECD nations currently sits at around 25%).47 Fortunately, despite 
disagreeing on the exact rate and which loopholes to close, both sides of the political aisle 
have called for the lowering of the corporate tax rate.  
Just as recently as 2012, President Obama recommended lowering the rate to 28% 
while closing certain loopholes, and more recently others have advocated for plans with 
even lower rates.48 Republican politicians, for example, seek a similar change, but want 
the rate lowered to 25%. Therefore, it looks likely that Congress will ultimately lower the 
rate; however, there is now way to no when this might happen, or to even guarantee that 
it will happen. Thus, this paper assumes the rates will remain at the current rate until 
further notice.  
Also, since the proposal attempts to reach a revenue neutral scenario, the 
proposed rates might seem high given the arguments just made, and people who feel the 
rate should be lowered might initially dismiss this proposal for that reason. However, the 
rates are proposed relative to the current rate in order to achieve revenue neutrality. As 
stated earlier, displaying revenue neutrality is key to making the proposal a realistic 
option. In other words, the argument for a lower rate should be separated out from this 
proposal. The focus should be on the ratio of the rates proposed. Since the ratio of 
proposed rates is tied to the current rate, the proposed rates can be adjusted up or down to 
whatever someone considers to be the ideal corporate rate. For example, if someone feels 
that the current corporate rate should be 28%, then the proposed rates will also drop to 
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match this. If someone feels the rate should be 40%, then the proposed rates will go up 
with it. 
It should also be noted that the proposal will analyze the statutory rate as opposed 
to the effective rate. The paper assumes that all credits and loopholes used by 
corporations will remain the same (with the exception of the foreign tax credit which the 
paper will address). Not to say that the loopholes and credits are not issues in of 
themselves; however, the paper simply chooses to focus on tax inversions and the 
associated problems of corporate taxation of foreign earnings. The proposal seeks to 
solve this problem without delving into the separate problems of credits and loopholes.  
The proposal uses a 35% rate for U.S.-sourced income earned by U.S.-based 
corporations, a 40% rate for U.S.-sourced income earned by foreign-based corporations, 
and a 2.5% rate for foreign-sourced income earned by U.S.-based corporations. To 
reiterate, all foreign earnings of a U.S.-based firm are taxed the year in which they are 
earned. Corporations no longer possess the ability to defer foreign profits, and 
corporations will no longer be able to use or receive foreign tax credits. As stated earlier, 
these rates are too high; however, for the sake of revenue neutrality they will not be 
changed. If someone feels that the ideal corporate rate is 28%, then the model can easily 
be adjusted resulting in lower rates across the board.  
The foreign rate is not higher in order to achieve revenue neutrality (this could be 
achieved using a 35% rate), but its purpose is to discourage firms from inverting outside 
the United States. Any firm that earns one-third or more of its profits will benefit by 
headquartering in the United States. Any firm that earns less than one-third will benefit 
from headquartering abroad. In doing this, the proposal aligns incentives so that 
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corporations elect to headquarter based upon the economic reality of the firm. If a firm 
has over one-third of its business in the U.S., it more likely than not has at least a 
plurality of its business in the United States. Therefore, it would make sense for that firm 
to headquarter in the United States. Likewise, it makes more sense for firms performing 
less than one-third of their business in the United States to headquarter abroad. Also, the 
more business a corporation has in the United States, the more it benefits from being a 
U.S.-based corporation, and vice versa, which logically seems how it should be.   
The results of the proposal are as follows:49 
 
 
2011 2010 2009 
U.S. income  $931,874,547   $941,983,728   $815,729,771  
U.S. Income less repatriated 
income   $719,542,059   $671,925,256   $572,874,012  
Recognized Foreign Income  $212,332,488   $270,058,472   $242,855,759  
Total Foreign Income from 
U.S. firms  $478,219,608   $444,629,192   $331,941,676  
Foreign firm US income  $9,121,201   $9,919,766   $7,012,428  
Taxes owed-current  $224,049,882   $218,083,141   $198,540,517  
Taxes owed-proposed  $267,443,691   $250,257,476   $211,609,417  
    Revenue Loss  $0     $0     $0    
extra taxable income needed  $0     $0     $0    
    Rev Gain  $43,393,809   $32,174,335   $13,068,901  
Income Cushion  $133,519,414   $98,997,954   $40,212,002  
% of total income 11% 9% 4% 
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Current Rate 
Proposed  
U.S. Rate 
Proposed Foreign    
Income Rate 
Proposed US rate for   
 Foreign firms 
       35%      35%         2.5%            40% 
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2008 2007 
U.S. income  $910,056,404   $1,129,996,905  
U.S. Income less foreign income  $694,673,014   $945,569,634  
Recognized Foreign Income  $215,383,390   $184,427,271  
Total Foreign Income from U.S. 
firms  $325,230,390   $283,289,571  
Foreign firm U.S. income  $6,403,170   $14,515,113  
Taxes owed-current  $223,734,722   $317,822,650  
Taxes owed-proposed  $253,827,583   $343,837,656  
   Revenue Loss  $0    $0   
Extra taxable income needed  $0     $0    
   Rev Gain  $30,092,861   $26,015,006  
Income Cushion  $92,593,418   $80,046,173  
% of total income 8% 6% 
 
   
 All of these numbers were calculated using the IRS tables provided on its website 
that aggregate the tax statistics from forms 1120 and 1120-F that corporations filed from 
2007-2011. Form 1120 is the form that all U.S.-based corporations must file, and 1120-F 
is the form foreign corporations file. Unfortunately, the IRS only provides the statistics 
up to 2011, so more recent years are not provided although it can be assumed that the 
statistics have not changed drastically since 2011.   
The first line item titled “U.S. income” aggregates total taxable income of all 
U.S.-based corporations, which includes currently recognized foreign income (i.e., 
subpart F income and repatriated profits).  The next line item, “U.S. income less foreign 
income,” removes the currently recognized foreign income from the initial “U.S. income” 
total. This calculation isolates income that corporations earn in the United States from 
income earned abroad.  
Next, the “Recognized Foreign Income” states the amount removed from “U.S. 
Income” when calculating “U.S. income less foreign income.” This total is then added to 
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the total profits actively reinvested abroad creating the “Total Foreign Income from U.S. 
firms” line item. This item combines the foreign profits corporations intend to defer with 
the profits it repatriated (including Subpart F) in order to provide the total foreign income 
that would be taxed at the proposed 2.5% rate.50 Then, the table provides the total income 
earned by foreign firms in the United States (“Foreign Firm U.S. Income”), which was 
pulled from the 1120-F tables.  
After this, the table displays the tax liabilities of all corporations owed to the 
United States under both the current system and the proposed system.  Again, these totals 
do not reflect actual liabilities, as it does not account for tax credits (other than the 
foreign tax credit), net operating losses, etc. The proposal simply focuses on corporate 
taxation of foreign earnings and, thus, assumes all else remains the same. Continuing, the 
current tax liability multiplies the sum of “U.S. Income” and “Foreign firm U.S. income” 
by the current corporate rate of 35%, and then this total is subtracted by that year’s 
foreign tax credit (pulled from the 1120 statistics).  The proposed tax liability looks like 
this: (“U.S. income less foreign income” x 35%)+(“Total foreign income of U.S. firms” x 
2.5%)+(“Foreign firm U.S. income x 40%).  
As it displays, this model results in a revenue gain for the United States 
government. The rates in the proposal can be manipulated a bit without sacrificing 
revenue neutrality. For example, if the proposed U.S. rate was dropped to 32% and the 
proposed foreign rate was raised to 4% while holding the proposed U.S. rate for foreign 
firms at 40%, then the United States would still reside in the revenue positive range for 
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every year. Or, the same would be true if the proposed U.S. rate were dropped to 33% 
and the proposed U.S. rate for foreign firms to 38%, while holding the proposed rate at 
2.5%. In other words, there is a fair amount of wiggle room in finding the exact rate that 
the United States should adopt. The table shows that the proposal can be revenue neutral; 
however, once this is proven, it is the logic behind the model that makes this proposal 
ideal from the United States’ perspective. 
The proposal addresses the foreign earnings of U.S. corporations. U.S. 
corporations currently have around $2 trillion in untaxed foreign earnings. Corporations 
truly intend to permanently reinvest significant amounts of this total in foreign ventures; 
however, a sizeable chunk is also being permanently reinvested solely to avoid U.S. 
taxation. By taxing all foreign earnings of a U.S.-based corporation at a relatively 
miniscule 2.5%, the United States receives some tax revenue that it normally would not 
see, and corporations can freely repatriate earnings back into the United States without 
punishment. Once U.S. corporations lose the disincentive to repatriate, the investments of 
profits in the United States would likely increase a fair amount.51 With this in mind, the 
increased investment activity could potentially increase total taxable U.S. income, thus, 
raising more revenue.52  However, since calculating this effect is complicated and largely 
hypothetical, it was left out of the model. That being said, it is still a thought to keep in 
mind.  
Also, the model should reduce inversions without employing complicated 
headquartering and anti-inversion rules. Over the past decade, the government provided 
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stricter rules on this matter and accomplished little in the way of reducing inversions.53 
Instead of placing a Maginot Line-esque barrier that corporations can easily work around, 
this proposal aligns incentives so as to discourage inversions and encourage firms to 
headquarter as they should. A firm with one-third of its income inside the United States 
would have the exact same U.S. tax liability regardless of where it chose to headquarter. 
The more income that a firm earns inside the United States, the more the system 
incentivizes them to remain in the United States. On the flip side, as U.S. income goes 
down, so does the incentive to remain in the U.S. Thus, since the incentives are properly 
aligned, the system allows firms to elect for themselves to determine where they 
headquarter.  
However, all this being said, corporations should not be able to switch their 
headquarters from year to year. Thus, it would make sense for firms to elect where they 
want to headquarter now, and the election must last ten years. Then, after every ten years, 
corporations can elect to change course. Therefore, if a firm elects to be foreign-based but 
ultimately earns more than one-third of its income in the U.S., then the U.S. receives 
more tax revenue. And, if that firm earns less than one-third, then it is headquartered as it 
should be. The opposite holds true for U.S.-based firms. It creates a win-win scenario for 
the United States.  
The model, however, fails to address the potentially increased incentive to strip 
income from the United States. Unfortunately, since the 2.5% rate is so low, U.S. firms 
will generally benefit by shifting U.S.-sourced income abroad.54 The 2.5% tax does, 
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however, create somewhat of a disincentive and gives the proposal an advantage over a 
pure territorial system because a territorial system creates no disincentive. That being 
said, the taxation of repatriated earnings probably creates a greater disincentive than does 
a 2.5% rate, so the proposal fails to match the current system in that regard.  
Fortunately, the proposal generates a revenue positive scenario for the United 
States. One that is relatively sizeable, which creates a significant cushion that possibly 
accounts for income stripping. For example, in 2011 the model shows that if U.S. 
corporations shifted over $130 billion outside of the United States, then the U.S. would 
still recognize a net gain in tax revenue. In other words, the cushion minimizes, to a 
certain degree, the impact of income stripping.  However, there still exists a few ways in 
which to minimize the actual act of income stripping.  
The IRS, for example, could utilize its enforcement ability and can impose a 
penalty on income it deems to be stripped out of the United States. For example, the IRS 
could tax any stripped income at a 40% rate. This would cause the IRS to create rules 
regarding the definition of income stripping and when corporations can and cannot do it. 
Although not necessarily ineffective, this solution runs contrary to the theme and logic 
behind the proposal, which seeks to remove the need for the IRS to create rules and 
definitions that further complicate the tax code.  
Much of this problem can be solved using lower tax rates. Once again, for 
emphasis, since the current U.S. rate is 35%, it is very difficult to achieve revenue 
neutrality using significantly lower rates. However, let’s assume that recently the U.S. 
decided to switch to a 25% corporate tax rate. This allows the model to input 25% as the 
“proposed U.S. rate” while maintaining revenue neutrality. Also, in this new model, the 
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“proposed foreign rate” should be raised to 5%, and the “proposed U.S. rate for foreign 
firms” should be lowered to 35%. With these assumptions, the model maintains revenue 
neutrality and maintains the same incentive structure regarding the decision on where to 
headquarter (the one-third threshold). However, one key difference is that the incentive to 
strip income decreases significantly. 
A 25% rate would make the U.S. corporate rate far more competitive relative to 
the rates of nations worldwide. That alone decreases the incentive to shift income.55 The 
tax savings of shifting income shrinks as the rate shrinks. For one, there would be fewer 
nations to shift income to simply because there would be fewer nations with lower rates 
than the United States. Secondly, income that is shifted to lower tax regions would 
produce smaller tax savings because the difference between the rates would be smaller. 
Then, add in a 5% rate on all foreign-sourced income and the benefits shrink even more. 
Although further research would need to be performed, it would not be surprising if this 
rate structure created a greater disincentive for income stripping than the taxation of 
repatriated earnings creates in the current system.  
Another possibility to solve this problem would be to utilize the financial 
statements of corporations. There would need to be a lot more research on this and 
probably several more theses to prove anything; however, the logic behind it is worth 
mentioning. The government can force corporations to include a section in their financial 
statements that details their income earned within the United States and income earned 
outside of it.  Then, ultimately, the percentage of U.S. income relative to foreign income 
reported for tax purposes should match the ratio present in the financial statements.  	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This system would balance the incentives of tax planning and financial reporting. 
Tax planning generally aims toward lowering income and financial reporting aims to 
raise income. Thus, when the financial reporting affects the tax planning, a more accurate 
income total will likely be reported. A firm may decide to alter the ratio so as to benefit 
tax-wise; however, then it risks showing investors that it underperformed in one the most 
important markets in the world. More likely than not, however, firms will elect to 
sacrifice tax-wise in order to benefit in the financial statements. The LIFO vs. FIFO 
choice provides evidence for this. 
Firms can elect to report inventory for financial reporting on a FIFO or a LIFO 
basis with the caveat that whichever method chosen must also be the method used for tax 
purposes. FIFO creates higher net income that benefits the financial statements, but it 
also increases the tax liability. LIFO does the opposite. Most firms elect for FIFO despite 
the tax advantage of LIFO.56  Therefore, if corporations had to use the ratio of U.S. vs. 
foreign income in their financial statements for tax purposes, then the incentive to shift 
income outside of the United States would likely decrease significantly. 
Another common criticism of offering a significant tax discount on foreign 
earnings is that it would encourage corporations to outsource manufacturing jobs. Vice-
President Joe Biden cited a study done saying that 800,000 jobs would be created 
overseas as the result of such a change.57 Although Vice-President Biden mistakenly 
assumed that job creation abroad prevents job creation in the United States, the concerns 
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are still valid.58 In deciding where to host a manufacturing plant, all else being equal, a 
corporation would choose the location with the lowest tax ultimately placing American 
workers at a disadvantage. However, in practice, “all else equal” rarely holds true, and 
factors unrelated to taxation generally play a far bigger role in the decision-making 
process. 
In the 90s, U.S. corporations outsourced millions of manufacturing jobs to China. 
With China’s tax rate being 33%, corporations did so in spite of the absence of significant 
tax benefits. Then, in the 2000s after China lowered its corporate rate to 25%, the trend 
started to shift in the other direction.59 In other words, corporations initially outsourced 
manufacturing jobs because China possessed a high quantity of cheap labor. However, in 
the 2000s the labor became more expensive, so the trend shifted despite the tax incentive 
to do otherwise.  
More recently, German auto manufacturers have outsourced manufacturing jobs 
to the South even though Germany has a far more reasonable corporate tax rate. The 
German companies instituted this change because they wanted to free themselves from 
the worker unions of Germany who were driving up the costs of labor. Therefore, they 
moved to the South where the unions have less power, keeping labor costs low relative to 
Germany and even the rest of the United States.60 In other words, taxation consistently 
plays a minimal role in the relocation of manufacturing jobs. 
Also, even with a rate as high as 35%, there appears to be few tax benefits 
associated with outsourcing jobs. Most "tax havens" throughout the world are too small 	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to support such a change. They simply do not have an adequate supply of labor.  Most 
nations with a large enough supply tend to have a rate that is relatively in line with the 
United States or at least one close enough so that non-tax factors play a bigger role in 
decision-making. Thus, the tax incentive to shift manufacturing jobs is relatively low, and 
if the U.S. lowered its rate to be in line with the OECD average, the incentive would 
essentially be eliminated. 
Although left unaddressed in the proposal, the profits currently deemed 
“permanently reinvested” abroad, roughly $2 trillion, should be discussed. Some might 
argue that these profits should be taxed at the newly proposed 2.5% rate. Some view the 
“permanent reinvestments” as tax evasion and hold the opinion that the corporations 
already benefitted by delaying their tax payment by several years. This line of thinking 
should not be dismissed. However, corporations do not always permanently reinvest 
profits for tax avoidance purposes.  Corporations will likely never repatriate a significant 
portion of the profits that they earned.61 Thus, it would be unfair to tax corporations on 
earnings they never anticipated to pay taxes on, especially when they based this 
assumption on legal means.  
However, some might still argue that firms should be given a break on the profits 
that they never intended to repatriate, but all other profits they did intend to repatriate 
should be taxed. However, this would violate the basic assumption of simplicity that this 
proposal seeks to achieve. Determining a steadfast rule for the true intention of a 
corporation regarding its foreign profits would almost never work in practice. Therefore, 
it makes the most sense to allow firms to repatriate, tax-free, all foreign earnings up to the 	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date of the change, especially considering the proposal ultimately creates a revenue gain 
for the United States.  
 
Conclusion 
 The current corporate tax system in the United States focuses on preventing 
corporate actions, but fails to account for the corporate incentives created by the system. 
In recent years, several notable U.S. corporations have inverted into a foreign company 
allowing them to move their headquarters outside of the United States. In response to 
this, the Treasury enacted rules that limit a corporation’s ability to change its 
headquarters post-inversion.  However, the anti-inversion rules have done little to deter 
inversions even as the rules became stricter because the rules did not change a firms 
incentive to invert.  
 When corporations possess a strong incentive to invert, it is not surprising they 
are able to expose loopholes in the rules considering they spend millions on tax advisors 
whose job is to expose loopholes. Thus, in order to fix corporate taxation, the Treasury 
must look to realign corporate incentives. Since the United States taxes corporations on 
their worldwide income at one of the highest tax rates in the world, there is an obvious 
incentive to become a foreign firm. The ability to defer actively reinvested foreign profits 
reduces this incentive to some degree but also creates an incentive to not reinvest in the 
United States, which makes little sense from the perspective of the United States.  
 Therefore, in reaction to this, many argue that the United States should institute a 
territorial system of taxation. A territorial system exempts foreign earnings from taxation, 
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thus, it allows U.S. corporations to be more competitive and removes the blockade to the 
repatriation of earnings. However, a pure territorial system creates an enormous incentive 
to strip income and makes it difficult to achieve tax neutrality. Therefore, it makes sense 
to tax foreign earnings, the year earned, at a small rate, while simultaneously raising the 
U.S. tax rate on foreign firms. This creates a disincentive to shift income and boosts tax 
revenue. Also, the increased tax rate on foreign firms creates an incentive structure such 
that corporations will accurately elect for themselves where they should headquarter. 
Ultimately, the focus of this proposal should be placed upon the logic behind it, not the 
exact rates used. As long as the rates remain somewhat in-line with the model, the logic 
will remain the same. Understanding the motivations and incentives of corporations is 
key to solving the issues imbedded within the system of corporate taxation. By changing 
the incentives, the proposal addresses the source of the problem, not the result.  
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